

Changes from Previous Month Noted in Red.

Leverage: Senior Debt/EBITDA

	< \$10MM EBITDA	> \$10MM EBITDA	> \$25MM EBITDA
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April 2026	2.00x - 2.50x	2.25x - 3.75x	4.25x - 5.25x
March 2026	2.00x - 3.00x	2.25x - 3.75x	4.25x - 5.25x
April 2025	1.50x - 2.50x	2.00x - 3.50x	4.00x - 5.00x
Commentary:	<i>Lenders Tightening Leverage for Smaller Issuers, But Maintaining Multiples for Larger, Higher Quality Assets</i>		

Leverage: Total Debt/EBITDA

	< \$10MM EBITDA	> \$10MM EBITDA	> \$25MM EBITDA
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April 2026	2.50x - 3.50x	4.00x - 5.50x	5.00x - 6.50x
March 2026	2.50x - 4.00x	4.00x - 5.50x	5.00x - 6.50x
April 2025	2.50x - 4.00x	4.00x - 5.50x	5.00x - 6.50x
Commentary:	<i>Lenders Tightening Leverage for Smaller Issuers, But Maintaining Multiples for Larger, Higher Quality Assets</i>		

Pricing: Senior Commercial Bank Cash Flow

	< \$10MM EBITDA	> \$10MM EBITDA	> \$25MM EBITDA
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April 2026	S+ 3.50% - 4.25%	S+ 3.00% - 3.75%	S+ 2.75% - 3.50%
March 2026	S+ 3.25% - 4.25%	S+ 3.00% - 3.75%	S+ 2.75% - 3.50%
April 2025	S+ 3.50% - 4.25%	S+ 3.25% - 3.75%	S+ 3.00% - 3.50%
Commentary:	<i>Pricing Under Greater Pressure Across the Board, But Especially for Lower Middle Market Issuers</i>		

Pricing: Senior Non-Bank/Unitranche

	< \$10MM EBITDA	> \$10MM EBITDA	> \$25MM EBITDA
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April 2026	S+ 5.50% - 7.50%	S+ 5.00% - 6.50%	S+ 4.25% - 5.75%
March 2026	S+ 5.25% - 7.00%	S+ 4.50% - 6.50%	S+ 4.25% - 5.75%
April 2025	S+ 6.00% - 7.50%	S+ 5.00% - 6.50%	S+ 4.25% - 6.00%
Commentary:	<i>Pricing Is Trending Higher for Most Issuers Except for Larger More Competitive Situations</i>		

Pricing: Junior Capital (Cash + PIK)

	< \$10MM EBITDA	> \$10MM EBITDA	> \$25MM EBITDA
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April 2026	13.00% - 16.00%	12.00% - 14.00% (S+ 7.5%-8.5%)	11.00% - 12.00% (S+ 6.25%-7.5%)
March 2026	12.00% - 15.00%	11.00% - 13.00% (S+ 6.5%-8.0%)	11.00% - 12.00% (S+ 6.25%-7.5%)
April 2025	13.00% - 16.00%	11.50% - 13.00% (S+ 7.0%-8.5%)	11.00% - 12.50% (S+ 6.50%-8.0%)
Commentary:	<i>Pricing Is Trending Higher for Most Issuers Except for Larger More Competitive Situations</i>		

Tone of the Market

For the first time since April of 2023 (remember SVB?), SPP is making marked changes to its Market-At-A-Glance metrics, increasing pricing and tightening leverage multiples for most lower middle market and mid-middle market issuers. Think of this month’s changes as “risk-off lite,” where leverage and pricing are static for the most attractive and larger issuers, but decidedly less aggressive for smaller and more cyclical issuers. This newfound “conservatism” spans the full spectrum of lenders, including commercial banks, non-bank direct lenders, private credit funds, BDCs, and SBICs. At the same time, deal flow, which had begun to bounce back to historical levels in Q1, has dwindled to a trickle in the last few weeks, reflecting increased macroeconomic and geopolitical uncertainty as well as heightened scrutiny of private credit. Though most of the noise surrounding private credit portfolios is focused on the software companies negatively impacted by advances in AI, the contagion to the larger private credit sector is real, dampening liquidity, slowing down deal processes, and disproportionately targeting lower middle-market issuers. Though private market liquidity conditions still remain relatively issuer-friendly for most transactions coming to market in April, continued macroeconomic volatility (elevated inflation fears coupled with GDP deceleration) and any new landmines from private credit could quickly alter the landscape and potentially morph into a “credit downcycle,” which could negatively impact a much broader swath of issuers. The two key takeaways this month for likely companies contemplating an issuance in 2026 are simple; first, it’s better to move sooner than later, and second, engaging in a broader, more comprehensive distribution strategy encompassing a diverse set of investing constituencies will yield the most successful execution.

Minimum Equity Contribution

For the last three years, the minimum level of cash equity in a deal has been a primary focus point for all leveraged buyouts. Regardless of enterprise multiples, lenders have sought at least ~40-50% LTV (i.e., equity capitalization equal to 40%-50% of enterprise value), and actual new cash in a deal needs to constitute at least 60% of the aggregate equity account. As market conditions have continued to favor issuers, and the market has become increasingly “*risk-on*,” equity contribution requirements have eased mildly, with lenders progressively becoming more comfortable with “*thinner*” equity capitalization schemes—both enhancing leverage capacity and turbocharging equity IRRs. We are confirming that threshold at 40% base equity capitalization, again with at least 60% of the aggregate equity account being new cash.

Equity Investment and Co-Investment

Liquidity for both direct equity investments and co-investments is robust, and in most cases, more competitive debt terms can be achieved where there is an opportunity for equity co-investment. Importantly, equity investment can take a variety of forms (preferred, common, warrants, even HoldCo notes) depending on the unique requirements of a given deal. Interest in independently sponsored deals continues to be strong as well, but investors will require that the independent sponsor has real “*skin in the game*” (i.e., a meaningful investment of their own above and beyond a roll-over of deal fees). While family offices remain the best source of straight common equity, credit opportunity funds, insurance companies, BDCs, and SBICs will actively pursue providing combined debt and equity tranches.

Dividend Recapitalization Liquidity

Leveraged recapitalization liquidity continues to be as robust as ever in Q1 2026. As a general proposition, private credit providers continue to provide the most aggressive terms for recap opportunities (i.e., leverage tolerances exceeding 4.5x LTM EBITDA and LTVs in excess of 50% TD/Enterprise Value), especially for larger middle-market issuers (>\$25 million of LTM EBITDA), but commercial banks will also step up to fund recapitalization financings, albeit with lower leverage (<3.0x LTM EBITDA) and LTV metrics (<40% TD/Enterprise Value) and usually combined with a historical credit relationship. Given the general pressure on PE sponsors to return capital, leveraged recapitalizations are a fast and readily accessible alternative to premature exits. Importantly, the historically prohibitive pricing premiums and limitations on debt capacity associated with “*non-accretive*” dividend recaps and share repurchases have in large part disappeared. Recap financings are, for all practical purposes, currently just as aggressively bid and sought after as more generic repricing, refinancing, and accretive acquisition financings. The renewed interest in recaps stretches down to issuers below \$10 million of LTM EBITDA.

Lower Middle Market / “Story” Receptivity

Though macroeconomic uncertainty historically disproportionately impacts lower middle issuers (<\$5 million of LTM EBITDA), “*storied*” credits, and other more “*marginal*” credit issuers, there is no dearth of interest even for smaller or storied credits. The demand for deal flow extends to lower middle market issuers, if for no other reason than that in Q1, the deal calendar remains light, and investors have the time necessary to understand and underwrite more challenging credit data. This year, given the decline in the cost of capital (reduced SOFR rates combined with tighter credit spreads), this asset class has also had the benefit of being one of the few areas where lenders can also pick up a healthier return for their efforts. Though pricing for lower middle market deals is not “*cheap*,” ranging from SOFR+6.00% to 8.00%, the delta between pricing for lower middle market issuers and pricing for middle market issuers is considerably narrower than it has been in the past.

"Oh, yeah
 Mmm
 Still don't know what I was waitin' for
 And my time was runnin' wild
 A million dead end streets and
 Every time I thought I'd got it made
 It seemed the taste was not so sweet
 So I turned myself to face me
 But I've never caught a glimpse
 How the others must see the faker
 I'm much too fast to take that test

Ch-ch-ch-ch-changes
 Turn and face the strange
 Ch-ch-changes
 Don't want to be a richer man
 Ch-ch-ch-ch-changes
 Turn and face the strange
 Ch-ch-changes
 There's gonna have to be a different man
 Time may change me
 But I can't trace time

Mmm, yeah
 I watch the ripples change their size
 But never leave the stream
 Of warm impermanence
 And so the days float through my eyes
 But still the days seem the same
 And these children that you spit on
 As they try to change their worlds
 Are immune to your consultations
 They're quite aware of what they're goin' through

Ch-ch-ch-ch-changes
 Turn and face the strange
 Ch-ch-changes
 Don't tell them to grow up and out of it
 Ch-ch-ch-ch-changes
 Turn and face the strange
 Ch-ch-changes
 Where's your shame?
 You've left us up to our necks in it
 Time may change me
 But you can't trace time?"

"Changes" – [David Bowie](#)


The Video: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IJSv6JXKS I>

State of the Private Market

Changes


For the first time since our April 2023 Market Update, SPP is raising credit spreads and tightening leverage metrics for issuers coming to market in Q2 2026. As further described below, a pivot to a moderately more "risk-off" perspective is unfolding in the private market, resulting from a combination of increased geopolitical and macroeconomic uncertainty (prompting a reevaluation of credit risk) and heightened private credit scrutiny (specifically, the composition and integrity of private credit portfolio asset valuations). Historically, this kind of double-edged threat to credit conditions would result in a pronounced deterioration in issuance conditions (i.e., a classic credit "down-cycle"),

Average Spread & Yield for New-Issue High Yield Deals




Source: Pitchbook

Concerns of Credit Default Risk Highest Since October 2023




Source: BofA Global Research

Leverage Ratios on the Rise in 2026



Source: The Daily Shot

U.S. Unitranche Volume



Source: LSEG PLC

increasing pricing and compressing leverage multiples across the credit spectrum. However, given the unprecedented growth in private credit over the course of the last decade, liquidity conditions remain surprisingly resilient for most issuers while disproportionately and adversely impacting lower middle-market issuers (sub-\$10 million in LTM EBITDA). Should recent global and economic influences moderate in the short term, it is likely that the same “risk-on,” bullish sentiment that characterized Q4 2025 and Q1 2026 will resume unabated; regardless, however, companies contemplating issuance over the next quarter should steel themselves for further “Changes.”


The last time SPP tightened leverage multiples and increased pricing was in the wake of the banking crisis when Silicon Valley Bank (“SVB”) failed after a bank run, marking the second-largest bank failure in United States history and the largest since the 2007–2008 financial crisis. It was one of three March 2023 U.S. bank failures (including Signature and First Republic Bank). We noted then, “Private market liquidity conditions currently are among the most arduous in the last decade,” and noted that declining credit market conditions were being exacerbated “by high interest rates (SOFR at ~4.85%), stubborn inflationary influences, and continued macroeconomic weakness. Not surprisingly, credit committees are taking a pronounced step back.” At the time, SPP raised its pricing by ~50 to 100 basis points and cut back leverage multiples across the credit spectrum by a half-turn of EBITDA. This month, SPP pricing increases are markedly less dramatic, increasing spreads for lower middle-market and mid-middle-market issuers by a range of about 25 to 50 basis points—with no modification whatsoever for larger issuers (>\$25 million EBITDA).

SPP’s pricing modifications in large part mirror recent pricing fluctuations in the high-yield market, which is often a good proxy for middle-market issuers (which by definition are below investment grade and more vulnerable to economic volatility). High yield spreads spiked in April by a factor of approximately 200 basis points. Pricing in the high yield and private middle market reflects increased credit risk perception by all the private market lending constituencies. In fact, a recent Bank of America global research study shows investor concerns of credit default risk have risen to their highest level since October of 2023. Default risk historically tracks higher debt-to-EBITDA ratios, and recent data published by Future Standard again confirms current trends; leverage ratios spanning the middle market have consistently ticked up over the course of the first four months of the year.

As noted above, what’s unique about this month’s pricing and leverage modifications is that they are in large part focused exclusively on lower middle-market and mid-middle-market issuers and not really impacting pricing and leverage for large middle-market private issuers (>\$25 million). This “Tale of Two Cities” syndrome (i.e., “it was the best of times, it was the worst of times”) can in large part be attributed to two distinct secular factors: *first*, a precipitous decline in deal flow overall (exacerbated, of course, by recent geopolitical and macroeconomic events); and *second*, the continued growth, strength, and sheer magnitude of the private credit sector.

Respecting deal flow, market professionals surveyed by SPP report that deal flow has continued to decline through Q1 and contracted to anemic levels in Q2. LSEG reported this month that the decline in deal flow for unitranche deals has been precipitous: “Amid fears around the potential impact of AI disintermediation on software and other sectors plus a challenging geopolitical backdrop, unitranche deal flow fell sharply in both the large corporate and middle market segments in 1Q26. Large corporate unitranche volume tumbled by 52% from the prior quarter to US\$30 billion, while unitranche lending in the middle market declined by 39% to US\$12.3 billion. From a new money perspective, unitranche lending fell by more


U.S. Leveraged Loan Launches Remain Muted




Source: Bloomberg Data

Private Credit AUM Growth

Private Credit AUM, Global (\$bn)




Private Debt AUM by Region of Focus (\$bn)



Source: Prequin, Barclays Research

Material BDC AUM Growth in the Last Decade



Source: BDC Collateral, Barclays Research


than half q-o-q to US\$30 billion in 1Q26.” U.S. leveraged lending has suffered a similar fate. According to Bloomberg, the U.S. leveraged loan market has struggled to regain momentum following a sharp slowdown in issuance in February, as market volatility continues to weigh on activity. “This week has shown signs of improvement, as \$9.4 billion has been launched into syndication through April 15, more than the previous three weeks combined. It remains a far cry from January when weekly launches regularly topped \$30 billion.”

Respecting the size of the private credit market (and the unprecedented largesse of capital available for deployment), there seems to be something of a “too big to fail” scenario at play. Notwithstanding countless articles on private credit exposure to software enterprises negatively impacted by technological advances in AI, and record redemptions in private credit funds over the course of the last few months, private credit providers remain flush with cash and continue to bid aggressively on certain transactions. Not even a hot war in the Middle East, rising inflation (CPI rose 0.9% in March and is up 3.3% annually), and slowing GDP (GDPNow predicting growth of 1.3%, down from 2.1% for the full year 2025) has lessened the seemingly insatiable appetite for new deal flow for larger middle market financings. Estimates respecting the size of the private credit market differ, but Prequin puts the size at \$1.78 trillion AUM, with just under \$1.2 trillion in the U.S. Interestingly, these AUM estimates exclude BDCs, whose AUM has grown to ~\$530 billion, which means the U.S. private credit AUM is really closer to \$1.3 trillion at present. That translates into intense competition for larger and more desirable private market assets, which, accordingly, is also keeping pricing and leverage levels right where they have been since the beginning of the year, immunizing these higher-quality financings from the pressures facing lower middle market and mid-middle market issuers this quarter.

Issuance strategy takes on increased significance when a market is in transition, and while it appears, at present, that the focus of the underwriting retrenchment is limited to lower middle, marginal (“storied”), or issuers particularly susceptible to macroeconomic volatility (construction, discretionary consumer, automotive, basic materials, IT, materials, and real estate), as history has shown repeatedly, contagion to a much broader swath of the market can happen with surprising speed. Accordingly, it behooves issuers contemplating a financing in the coming months to engage in a few deliberate strategies to maximize exposure and competition. Specifically:

- **Offering Materials** – When timing is critical, the quality of offering materials is essential to a successful execution. That includes a comprehensive and detailed financing model of the issuer (including any potential acquisition), with a pro-forma projection that incorporates the equity thesis and a detailed deck (“CIM”) that provides enough for a potential investor to get through credit committee on an expedited basis. If appropriate, a quality of earnings (“QofE”) can only further expedite review and closing.
- **Distribution** – A broad and thoughtful outreach is essential in any market environment, which is only more so the case when conditions get choppy. The goal is to maximize exposure and competition both among and within alternative investing constituencies (commercial banks, non-bank direct lenders, BDCs, SBICs, insurance companies, and SBICs). A strategy should incorporate ABL/cash flow alternatives and both unitranche and senior/sub bifurcated combinations to assure maximum optionality. Internal underwriting factors plague different lenders at different times and hitting a broad array of potential lenders is crucial. Importantly, many of these groups can provide


Contracted Unemployment Rate (U-6 & U-3)



Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics


GDPNow Data Real GDP Forecast for Q1 2026

Evolution of Atlanta Fed GDPNow real GDP estimate for 2026: Q1
Quarterly percent change (SAAR)




Source: Atlanta Fed

ISM Manufacturing and Non-Manufacturing Indices



Source: Institute for Supply Management

University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index



Source: Surveys of Consumers: University of Michigan

both debt and equity solutions where appropriate. By embracing a more holistic approach that is inclusive, issuers will have enhanced optionality and can choose a financing partner that presents the most competitive elements (cost of capital, amortization, covenant flexibility, and fees), as well as the broadest mix of options (delay-draw facilities, capex and acquisition lines, etc.).


- **Professional Management** – While it is not uncommon for repeat issuers and large committed funds with dedicated finance staffs to undertake a financing on their own, the assistance of an established and well-regarded agent cannot be underestimated. Execution risk is minimized, optionality is enhanced, and pricing and terms are optimized through the competitive auction process. While fees are charged for intermediation services, the quantitative benefits (lower pricing, closing, prepayment and unused facility fees, etc.) and qualitative improvements (post-closing liquidity options, greater covenant and operating flexibility, etc.) almost always inure to the issuer far beyond the cost. As evidence to support the proposition that SPP sponsored deals receive maximum exposure and competitive pressure, we average an oversubscription rate of approximately 5.50x since 2010.

The Macroeconomic Picture

In its March 2026 Federal Open Market Committee (“FOMC”) statement, the Federal Reserve maintained its benchmark interest rate at 3.50% to 3.75%. The move follows the central bank’s decision to hold rates steady in January after three successive 25-basis-point rate cuts in September, October, and December, to close out last year. Economic data showing a slowdown in the labor market, continued inflation above the Fed’s 2% target, and the unrest in Iran prompted policymakers to continue to pause rate cuts. *“Uncertainty about the economic outlook remains elevated. The implications of developments in the Middle East for the U.S. economy are uncertain. The Committee is attentive to the risks to both sides of its dual mandate,”* the March statement read.

The March meeting also saw the release of the updated Summary of Economic Projections (“SEP”). The SEP represents the median of the individual forecasts submitted by each of the FOMC participants. Relative to the December update, the median projection for real GDP growth was upgraded to 2.4% (previously 2.3%) in 2026 and 2.3% (previously 2.0%) in 2027. The long-term outlook was also revised higher to 2.0% (from 1.8%); the median year-end unemployment forecast for 2026 was unchanged at 4.4%, and 2027 was nudged higher to 4.3% (previously 4.2%). Core PCE inflation, the Fed’s preferred inflation gauge, was revised higher to 2.7% for 2026 (previously 2.5%) and 2.2% in 2027 (previously 2.1%), while the median projection for the federal funds rate was kept unchanged and suggests just one additional quarter-point cut in both 2026 and 2027.

During the post-statement news conference, Fed Chair Jerome Powell said it was *“too soon to know”* the impact of the war, adding, *“Near term measures of inflation expectations have risen in recent weeks, likely reflecting the substantial rise in oil prices caused by the supply disruptions in the Middle East.”* Due to high inflation and rising energy costs from the conflict in Iran, markets no longer expect the Fed to cut rates anytime soon. Following the latest jobs report, the CME FedWatch Tool shows a 98% probability that rates will stay the same at the upcoming April meeting (28th – 29th). Given the ongoing geopolitical volatility, the Fed is likely to remain cautious until inflation shows clearer signs of slowing down.



Source: FRED, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

Below is a recap of the most recent key economic releases:

Theme: *The MLB is Back!*

Employment: *Non-Farm Finds Its Swing* – Total nonfarm payroll employment increased by 178 thousand in March, a stark reversal from the revised 133 thousand decline in February and better than the Dow Jones consensus estimate for 59 thousand. January's reported gain of 126 thousand was also revised by 34 thousand to an overall gain of 160 thousand. Additionally, the unemployment rate changed little, falling to 4.3% from February's reading of 4.4%. In March, job gains were concentrated in health care (76 thousand), construction (26 thousand), and transportation and warehousing (21 thousand). Overall, the U.S. labor market bounced back in March, with job creation much stronger than expected through the broader picture of a slow-growth labor market. *"The bottom line is March was somewhat encouraging, but it's been a rocky year for the labor market with almost no hiring since last April,"* said Heather Long, chief economist at Navy Federal Credit Union, adding, *"The March data will keep the Federal Reserve on hold, but no one is declaring victory yet. It's likely to be a tough spring for job seekers."*

The latest jobs data did little to shift the market's expectation that the Fed is likely to leave interest rates unchanged for the foreseeable future. *"The broader story of 2026 so far remains one of recalibration rather than acceleration. Slowing population growth, a steep drop in immigration, and declining labor force participation mean the economy simply doesn't need to produce the job gains of prior cycles to keep unemployment stable,"* stated Laura Ullrich, director of economic research for Indeed Hiring Lab.

GDP: *GDP Beats the Tag* – GDP, the sum of all goods and services activity, increased at an annual rate of 0.5 percent in the fourth quarter of 2025, according to the *"third"* estimate from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (*"BEA"*). In the third quarter, real GDP increased by 4.4%. The Atlanta Fed's GDPNow estimate for real GDP growth (seasonally adjusted rate) in the first quarter of 2026 is 1.3% as of April 9th.

Inflation: *Fed Commands the Strike Zone* – The Core PCE Price Index, the Federal Reserve's preferred measure of inflation, read 3.0 percent annual growth in February, and the overall PCE Price Index measured 2.8 percent year-over-year. The March PCE data is set to be released on April 30th. The CPI for All Urban Consumers increased 0.9 percent on a seasonally adjusted basis in March, after rising 0.3 percent in February, and increased 3.3 percent for the 12 months ending March. The Core CPI (the index for all items less food and energy) rose 0.2 percent in March and 2.6 percent over the year, following a 2.5-percent increase over the 12 months ending February.

ISM Manufacturing and Services: *Manufacturing Plays Small Ball* – ISM's manufacturing index (the *"PMI"*) registered 52.7 percent in March, a 0.3-percentage point increase compared to February's reading of 52.4 percent. *"In March, U.S. manufacturing activity remained in expansion territory, growing at a slightly faster pace than the month before. Of the five subindexes that make up the PMI, the New Orders Index indicated slower growth compared to the previous month, the Production Index grew at a faster rate, and the Employment and Inventories indexes remained in contraction. This month also marks the first report with panelists citing the Iran war as a new impact to their business, along with ongoing uncertainty with U.S. economic policy, despite the recent Supreme Court ruling striking down International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) tariffs,"* stated Susan Spence, Chair of the Institute for Supply Chain Management Manufacturing Business Survey Committee. The non-manufacturing index (the *"NMI"* or *"Services Index"*) reported a March reading of 54.0 percent, a decrease of 2.1 percentage points from February's figure of

56.1 percent. 13 service industries reported growth in March, one fewer than in February.

Consumer Confidence: *Sentiment Strikes Out Looking* – In March, the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index decreased to 53.3 from February’s reading of 56.6, a -5.8% month-over-month change and a -6.5% year-over-year change. Preliminary results for April show a steep decrease, down to a reading of 46.6. Joanne Hsu, director of the Surveys of Consumers at the University of Michigan, stated, “Consumer sentiment sank about 11% this month, extending a decline that began with the start of the Iran conflict, and is currently about 9% below a year ago. Demographic groups across age, income, and political party all posted setbacks in sentiment, as did every component of the index, reflecting the widespread nature of this month’s fall.” Hsu added, “Economic expectations will likely improve after consumers gain confidence that the supply disruptions stemming from the Iran conflict have ended and gas prices have moderated.” Final April data is set to be released on Friday, April 24th.

SPP CAPITAL PARTNERS

SPP Capital Partners is a leading middle market investment bank focused on raising private debt and equity for our corporate and equity sponsor clients.

For over 35 years, SPP Capital Partners, LLC (“SPP”) has been active in structuring both private debt and equity raises for our corporate and equity sponsor clients. SPP’s dedicated focus on middle market capital raises provides an unparalleled depth of experience and capital provider network. SPP’s senior management has over 100 years of aggregate experience in the private capital markets and has completed over 570 transactions amounting to more than \$27 billion of capital. SPP averages approximately \$1 billion in annual transaction volume and boasts a 5.0x average oversubscription rate since 2010. SPP’s relationships with over 700 investors across all major constituencies in the private capital markets, alongside its professionally managed, competitive auction process, offer clients the following: Competition among, and within, all investor constituencies; True “market auction” terms; Access to key decision makers; and Introductions to groups that go significantly beyond our clients’ existing relationships.

SPP By the Numbers

35+

Year History

570+

Transactions Completed

\$27B+

Capital Raised

700+

Active Relationships with Leading Debt & Equity Providers

90+

Private Equity Clients

~\$1B

Annual Transaction Volume

Our Capabilities & Capital Network

Capital Structures Placed


Asset-Backed & Cash Flow Loans	Portfolio-Level NAV Loans
Structured Senior Loans (Last Out, Split Lien, etc.)	Real Estate & Sale-Leaseback Financing
Unitranche	Incremental Facilities (Accordion, DDTL, etc.)
Junior Debt (Second Lien, Mezzanine, etc.)	Common Equity
Institutional Private Placements	Preferred Equity

Capital Providers Engaged

Commercial Banks	Small Business Investment Companies (“SBICs”)
Non-Bank Direct Lenders	Insurance Companies & Pension Funds
Bank & Non-Bank Real Property Lenders	Private & Growth Equity Funds
Credit Opportunity Funds	Equity Co-Investment Funds
Business Development Companies (“BDCs”)	Hedge Funds
Traditional LP Mezzanine Funds	Family Offices


Supporting Data

Historical Senior Debt Cash Flow Limit (x EBITDA)




Source: SPP's "MIDDLE MARKET LEVERAGE CASH FLOW MARKET AT A GLANCE"

Historical Total Debt Limit (x EBITDA)




Source: SPP's "MIDDLE MARKET LEVERAGE CASH FLOW MARKET AT A GLANCE"

Historical Senior Cash Flow Pricing (Bank)




Source: SPP's "MIDDLE MARKET LEVERAGE CASH FLOW MARKET AT A GLANCE"

Historical Unitranche Pricing




Source: SPP's "MIDDLE MARKET LEVERAGE CASH FLOW MARKET AT A GLANCE"

Historical Subordinated Debt Pricing



Source: SPP's "MIDDLE MARKET LEVERAGE CASH FLOW MARKET AT A GLANCE"

Historical Minimum Equity Contribution



Source: SPP's "MIDDLE MARKET LEVERAGE CASH FLOW MARKET AT A GLANCE"

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(212) 455-4502

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